“A European superstate? With its own army? That remains a long shot.”

The competition between the United States and China is shaping international and geopolitical affairs. What does this mean for Europe? Are we mere bystanders, or do we have a say? Both, says Professor Luis Simón, an expert in international security and transatlantic relations. “Europe is both a playing field and a player in this rivalry.”

Sign up for the waiting list for the ERC inaugural lecture by Prof. Luis Simón on February 12.

Luis Simón is Director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the VUB. The funding for this research group – with more than fifty staff members – speaks volumes about the quality of the research and the political significance attached to it. The CSDS receives funding from the EU, NATO, the FWO, Japan, and South Korea, and has also secured two prestigious ERC grants (European Research Council). On 12 February, Luis Simón will deliver his ERC inaugural lecture at the VUB on his central research theme: Europe's role in the competition between America and China. His starting point: Europe is both a playing field and a player in this rivalry.

How is Europe a playing field in the US-China power struggle?
Luis Simón: “What Europe decides and how it positions itself in terms of trade, technology, and diplomacy influences the balance of power between the US and China. That is why both powers seek to influence our decisions. However, they do so in very different ways, as their relationships with Europe are fundamentally distinct. The US and Europe share deep and enduring economic, military, and cultural ties – we are, in a way, part of the same family. In contrast, Europe’s relationship with China is mostly economic, and even that is relatively new and increasingly complex. Security ties with China are minimal, if they exist at all.”

Does China attempt to build a friendly relationship with Europe?
“I don’t think friendship is the most appropriate category here. In any case, China harbours no illusions about matching the US's proximity and influence. Instead, its strategy is one of damage limitation.”

Both the US and China attempt to influence European decisions. How do they do this?
“Through a carrot and stick approach – offering incentives or exerting coercion, often economic. But in the case of the United States imitation or emulation – what others have termed “soft power” – is also a powerful factor, in the sense that you will see many European countries following the United States or aligning themselves with it even without Washington pressuring them to do so.”

Can you give an example of this external pressure?
“A few years ago, the US decided to exclude Chinese company Huawei from its 5G network infrastructure and pressured EU countries to do the same. Washington warned that intelligence-sharing with countries allowing Huawei could be curtailed. China, in turn, threatened economic retaliation, warning that those banning Huawei would face reduced investment and restricted access to the Chinese market.”

How did Europe respond?
“France, Italy, Sweden, and the Czech Republic took the initiative in creating the EU’s 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox – a checklist for member states to assess their network security. Some EU countries have since banned specific 5G providers, while others are still deliberating.”

So EU member states decide independently on such matters?
“Yes: the EU can provide guidelines but the implementation remains in the hands of the member states. In this case the guidelines were light, partly due to existing differences between key member states, notably France and Germany. France wanted both technical and political criteria for excluding high-risk providers, whereas Germany insisted on purely technical considerations.”

Are the US and China trying to drive wedges between EU countries? ? In your research, you describe their pressure as ‘external wedging’.
“Their goal isn’t necessarily to divide Europe, but that is often the result. In the sense that they try to influence the position of individual member states and in doing so they make it harder for a common European position to emerge.”

How do European countries counter this pressure?
“Coalitions of European actors push back against external division tactics, striving for policies that align with their interests. This process of internal cohesion, which I call ‘internal binding,’ is key. The 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox is an example of such an internal binding mechanism. It helps European nations stand their ground in discussions with the US and China. This demonstrates how Europe is not just a playing field for external pressure but also an active player.”

EU member states frequently clash on defence matters. One of your studies examines the divergent views of France and Germany on Europe’s defence industry. Why the disagreement?
“Both countries agree on the need for greater European cooperation in defence, but they have starkly different approaches about how to organize such cooperation. This has to do with their respective strengths and weaknesses. France is more competitive than Germany in the defense sector. Thus, for instance, when it comes to European armaments programs - like the Future Combat Air System - France will advocate for efficiency and a ‘best athlete’ principle, and Germany will try to protect its own autonomy and work share and call for ‘juste retour’. 

"Many EU nations fear domination by fellow European states more than they fear US influence"

So much for unity...
“Countries pursue European collaboration while also considering their national interests.”

How do they attempt to influence one another?
(Laughs) “Now it gets tricky. Powerful countries like France and Germany, the ‘internal binders,’ can also use coercion and incentives, just like external players. However, overt pressure is frowned upon within the EU, as the Union is built on trust. Thus, coercion is usually subtle. An extreme example is the withholding of EU funds to push Hungary into compliance with European norms.”

Does the EU need to become a superstate to play a significant geopolitical role?
“That would be the clearest path to greater independence from external powers. But many EU nations fear domination by fellow European states more than they fear US influence. For them, American involvement acts as a counterbalance against a Europe led by France or Germany, or both of them.”

Won't this change with a second Trump term?
“I expect more rhetoric about European unity and strategic autonomy, but not necessarily concrete actions. Europe remains heavily reliant on US security, particularly in the east. I don’t foresee major EU nations breaking ties with the US. Instead, they will likely do just enough to keep America engaged, knowing that the US has long-term strategic interests in Europe. We still don’t know that Trump wants to abandon Europe or even drastically reduce the US role there. It’s too soon to tell and there could be a lot of posturing. Even assuming if he did, Trump’s presidency is limited to four years. Midterm elections could weaken his position, and his actual policy intentions remain unclear.”

Recently, the 27 EU states met in Brussels for a defence summit on military investment. As expected, there were differing views.
“France and the Baltic states advocate financing defence via EU loans. German politicians, like CDU leader Friedrich Merz, oppose this, preferring to streamline military cooperation and resources for efficiency.”

"In war, decisions cannot be made by committee; a clear chain of command is essential"

That last point should be feasible, right? In 2024, the European member states spent 326 billion euros on defense, more than double that of Russia, yet Europe still lacks military clout. Why?
“Because Russia is a state, and Europe is not.”

So a unified European army is out of the question?
“Yes. Europe is exploring collective mechanisms to encourage more military spending, but there is a vast gap between that and a common army. Europeans have national armies but the EU lacks the structure to coordinate them effectively. NATO, by contrast, has an integrated command system, clear hierarchy, and standardised communication protocols. European forces can train together in peacetime and fight together in wartime under NATO’s umbrella. No comparable EU framework exists.”

Could Europe function more independently within NATO?
“That’s an old debate resurfacing now. Some propose an EU pillar within NATO, allowing for operations with minimal US involvement. The challenge is: if the US is not leading, then who is? In war, decisions cannot be made by committee; a clear chain of command is essential.”

What if Trump threatens to pull the US out of NATO again?
“It’s too early to speculate. Despite tensions, Trump’s first term saw some degree of transatlantic cooperation. We could see a repeat: fiery rhetoric at the start, calling the EU member states ‘delinquents’, followed by a ‘fantastic deal’ for ‘the best alliance in history’.

How can Europe become more of an active player and less of a passive playing field?
“Europe doesn’t need to break away from the US to be a player. It can be a player and still be aligned with the United States. We can invest more in NATO while simultaneously boosting economic and technological resilience, whether in coordination with the US or independently.”

With the United States stepping back from the Paris Climate Agreement, some voices are calling for a strategic partnership between Europe and China on climate action. 
“For China, the rift between Europe and America is a sore spot they are bound to press on. Climate issues are an obvious entry point for collaboration with Europe. I foresee a Chinese charm offensive. But I remain sceptical. Climate action is deeply intertwined with economic, industrial, and technological policies. You can’t simply separate these aspects. Any serious climate strategy demands alignment across all these domains.”

Do you think such collaboration is unlikely?
“It would politically rip Europe apart. For many European countries, their relationship with America is vital. For some – particularly those who face an acute security threat in the east –  the importance of the US and NATO even outweighs that of the EU itself. Politically, economically, culturally, and historically, we are far closer to America than to China. Just consider how China exerts pressure on other nations—overtly coercive and controlling. The US can also apply pressure (just like Europeans do among themselves), But it’s more indirect, a hands-off approach. That aligns much better with European values.”